HPG hoàn thành Dung Quất vào top 50 thế giới

HPG sẽ khó chỉnh nếu như Tây vẫn tiếp tục mua ròng. Hơn nữa thứ 4 này chốt quyền ĐHCĐ, thứ 6 ETF bắt đầu cơ cấu danh mục. Đó là những điểm tựa tốt cho HPG trong ngắn hạn.
Theo tôi sang đầu tháng 3 HPG sẽ chỉnh, anh em khi đó tranh thủ mua vào vì hiện nay mới chỉ bắt đầu cho quá trình uptrend.

hy vọng vượt 35 ngon lành.

anh em vẫn đông đủ nhỉ em giữ được mấy K qua thời kỳ giông bão hôm nay mua thêm một ít để cùng tàu với anh em @chichchoe36 , tính ra vẫn lãi

Tuần trước tôi dự đoán nhịp này HPG lên 36x, không biết có được không.

Thư gửi Cổ đông của Buffet 2019.
Berkshire earned $4.0 billion in 2018 utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (commonly called 「GAAP」). The components of that figure are $24.8 billion in operating earnings, a $3.0 billion non-cash loss from an impairment of intangible assets (arising almost entirely from our equity interest in Kraft Heinz), $2.8 billion in realized capital gains from the sale of investment securities and a $20.6 billion loss from a reduction in the amount of unrealized capital gains that existed in our investment holdings.
A new GAAP rule requires us to include that last item in earnings. As I emphasized in the 2017 annual report, neither Berkshire’s Vice Chairman, Charlie Munger, nor I believe that rule to be sensible. Rather, both of us have consistently thought that at Berkshire this mark-to-market change would produce what I described as 「wild and capricious swings in our bottom line.」
The accuracy of that prediction can be suggested by our quarterly results during 2018. In the first and fourth quarters, we reported GAAP losses of $1.1 billion and $25.4 billion respectively. In the second and third quarters, we reported profits of $12 billion and $18.5 billion. In complete contrast to these gyrations, the many businesses that Berkshire owns delivered consistent and satisfactory operating earnings in all quarters. For the year, those earnings exceeded their 2016 high of $17.6 billion by 41%.
Wide swings in our quarterly GAAP earnings will inevitably continue. That’s because our huge equity portfolio – valued at nearly $173 billion at the end of 2018 – will often experience one-day price fluctuations of $2 billion or more, all of which the new rule says must be dropped immediately to our bottom line. Indeed, in the fourth quarter, a period of high volatility in stock prices, we experienced several days with a 「profit」 or 「loss」 of more than $4 billion.
Our advice? Focus on operating earnings, paying little attention to gains or losses of any variety. My saying that in no way diminishes the importance of our investments to Berkshire. Over time, Charlie and I expect them to deliver substantial gains, albeit with highly irregular timing.
Long-time readers of our annual reports will have spotted the different way in which I opened this letter. For nearly three decades, the initial paragraph featured the percentage change in Berkshire’s per-share book value. It’s now time to abandon that practice.
The fact is that the annual change in Berkshire’s book value – which makes its farewell appearance on page 2 – is a metric that has lost the relevance it once had. Three circumstances have made that so. First, Berkshire has gradually morphed from a company whose assets are concentrated in marketable stocks into one whose major value resides in operating businesses. Charlie and I expect that reshaping to continue in an irregular manner. Second, while our equity holdings are valued at market prices, accounting rules require our collection of operating companies to be included in book value at an amount far below their current value, a mismark that has grown in recent years. Third, it is likely that – over time – Berkshire will be a significant repurchaser of its shares, transactions that will take place at prices above book value but below our estimate of intrinsic value. The math of such purchases is simple: Each transaction makes per-share intrinsic value go up, while per-share book value goes down. That combination causes the book-value scorecard to become increasingly out of touch with economic reality.
In future tabulations of our financial results, we expect to focus on Berkshire’s market price. Markets can be extremely capricious: Just look at the 54-year history laid out on page 2. Over time, however, Berkshire’s stock price will provide the best measure of business performance.
Before moving on, I want to give you some good news – really good news – that is not reflected in our financial statements. It concerns the management changes we made in early 2018, when Ajit Jain was put in charge of all insurance activities and Greg Abel was given authority over all other operations. These moves were overdue. Berkshire is now far better managed than when I alone was supervising operations. Ajit and Greg have rare talents, and Berkshire blood flows through their veins.
Investors who evaluate Berkshire sometimes obsess on the details of our many and diverse businesses – our economic 「trees,」 so to speak. Analysis of that type can be mind-numbing, given that we own a vast array of specimens, ranging from twigs to redwoods. A few of our trees are diseased and unlikely to be around a decade from now. Many others, though, are destined to grow in size and beauty.
Fortunately, it’s not necessary to evaluate each tree individually to make a rough estimate of Berkshire’s intrinsic business value. That’s because our forest contains five 「groves」 of major importance, each of which can be appraised, with reasonable accuracy, in its entirety. Four of those groves are differentiated clusters of businesses and financial assets that are easy to understand. The fifth – our huge and diverse insurance operation – delivers great value to Berkshire in a less obvious manner, one I will explain later in this letter.
Before we look more closely at the first four groves, let me remind you of our prime goal in the deployment of your capital: to buy ably-managed businesses, in whole or part, that possess favorable and durable economic characteristics. We also need to make these purchases at sensible prices.
Sometimes we can buy control of companies that meet our tests. Far more often, we find the attributes we seek in publicly-traded businesses, in which we normally acquire a 5% to 10% interest. Our two-pronged approach to huge-scale capital allocation is rare in corporate America and, at times, gives us an important advantage.

em nghĩ nhịp này lên 36 được dòng tiền đang rất mạnh, và HPG còn nhiều nhiệm vụ phải làm để đua hình ảnh TTCK việt nam đi lên cùng với VCB và cổ phiếu của anh Vượng

haizz em thấy bác hơi… tham vọng rồi.

Có hơi bạo dâm quá không anh em

--- Gộp bài viết, Feb 25, 2019, Bài cũ: Feb 25, 2019 ---

Vãi nồi hẳn là lệnh vã 300k giá 35.

CE phát để nhà em lấy động lực thoát hàng nào

Dự hôm nay tím ngắt! 35.25 rồi.